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Abstract:  
 
While scholars and policymakers have realized the importance of information and 
communication technologies in economic development, relatively less attention has been given 
to the role of cybersecurity. This research sheds light on issues associated with the "dark side" of 
digitization in the Global South. We examine the hollowness in the Global South’s digitization 
initiatives that is associated with a poor cybersecurity. The article also advances our 
understanding of how institutional and structural characteristics of the Global South influence 
cybersecurity. 
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Article:  
 
Introduction 
 
While the rapid growth in Internet penetration has a potential to contribute to economic and 
social development of the Global South (hereinafter: GS), analysts are concerned about the dark 
side of this rapid digitization. The spread of the Internet's penetration to more and more people in 
the GS has the potential to fundamentally alter the global cybercrime and cybersecurity 
landscapes. Referring to the emerging nature of the new threats with the entry into the 
cyberworld of yet unconnected population in the GS, Victoria Baines, Europol’s Strategic 
Advisor on Cybercrime noted: “With two-thirds of the world yet to join the Internet, we can 
expect to see new criminals, new victims and new kinds of threats” (icspa.org 2012). Gady 
(2010) has put it most strongly in his argument that Africa’s “Cyber [weapon of mass 
destruction] WMD” potentially poses a direct threat to the world. This analogy is especially 
relevant for many GS countries such as those in Africa, which have a large proportion of 
unprotected computers. For instance, in 2010, 80% PCs used in Africa were infected with viruses 
and malware (Gady 2010). Cybercriminals often use these unprotected computers to launch 
cyberattacks against targets all over the world. Unsurprisingly some GS countries are top cyber-
crime sources. According to Kaspersky Labs, in 2009 seven of the top 10 countries for creating 
trojans designed to steal passwords were GS countries, which accounted for 92% of such trojans 
globally (Kshetri 2010b). 
 
Some of the key economic and social characteristics of the GS include low level of human 
development index, high unemployment rate, high degree of income inequality, low level of 
education, and weak democratic institutions (UNDP 2006). These characteristics have important 
implications and consequences for cybersecurity (Kshetri 2013a, c, 2016a). The objective of this 
paper is to provide insights into the dark side of digitalization associated with the GS.  
 
Rapidly escalating cybercrime is one of the most pressing global challenges shared by both the 
Global North and GS (Nye 2011). In terms of the roles in facilitating illicit transnational 
economic activities, Andreas (2011) describes the Internet as “simply the latest—and not 
necessarily the most important—chapter in an old story”. Many analysts, however, have 
suggested that the Internet has potentially dramatic consequences in terms of stimulating illicit 
cross-border activities that are unmatched by any other previous technologies (See Kshetri 2013a 
for review). There are a number of considerations that merit special attention in cybercrime and 
cybersecurity issues associated with the GS. Since most of the global demand for digital 
technologies is likely to be from the GS in the near future, cybercrimes in these countries deserve 
special attention (Kshetri 2013a). Analysing the trend of cybercrimes across countries, analysts 
have suggested 10–15% Internet penetration as the threshold level for the generation of 
significant hacking activities (Reilly 2007). Internet penetrations in many GS economies have 
reached this level. From our perspective, the most important aspect of the global cybercrime 
industry is that the highest incidences of cybercrime as well as growth rates have been reported 
in some of the economies of the GS. For instance, among the 12 countries that experienced the 
highest increases in their share of cyberattacks during 2005–2009, 11 were from the GS: 
Romania (1,501%), Colombia (749%), Indonesia (675%), Thailand (570%), Bangladesh (416%), 
Iran (370%), Zimbabwe (361%), Saudi Arabia (237%), Nigeria (214%), Vietnam (193%) and 
Kenya (161%) (Kim et al. 2012). 
 
The GS not only accounts for the origination of a significant proportion of the most high-profile 
cybercrimes, but has also been a target of some of the most sophisticated cyberattacks. A case in 
point is the Stuxnet worm discussed above, which appeared in the second half (H2) of 2010 and 
crashed industrial control computers in a number of GS economies. A highly visible and 
unambiguous target was the Iranian nuclear programme. Nonetheless, the worm also disrupted 
the operations of industrial control computers in plants in China, India and Indonesia (Fildes 
2010). 
 
There are also reports that traditional organized crime groups in the GS have been involved in 
cybercrime. For instance, Chinese gangs, Colombian cartels and Russian and Malaysian 
organized crime groups have reportedly employed hackers, diverted their efforts from traditional 
activities to cybercrime and expanded their businesses globally (Kshetri 2010b). 
 
Finally, due to cybersecurity related concerns, GS-based firms have faced barriers to 
international trade and investment in a broad range of countries. For instance, Australian, Indian, 
and the U.S. governments have accused the Chinese company, Huawei Technologies of 
cyberespionage, which hindered the company’s internationalization (Kshetri 2016b). 
 
The above observations suggest that cybersecurity-related issues are rapidly emerging in the GS, 
which have important economic, social and political implications. Nonetheless, in little research 
have scholars directly considered factors associated with cybersecurity in the developing world. 
In order to contribute to filling this gap, this research seeks to explain how structural and 
institutional forces influence cybersecurity in the GS. 
 
Before proceeding, some clarifying definitions are offered. For the purpose of this article, the 
United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) is used to 
classify economies into the Global South and the Global North. More specifically, in the 2009 
UNDP Human Development Report, the “South” is used to refer to economies that had a HDI of 
less than 0.9 (Bakewell 2009). Institutions are “macro-level rules of the game” (North 1990, p. 
27), which include: a) formal institutions such as rules, laws, constitutions; and b) informal 
institutions such as social norms, conventions and self-imposed codes (North 1996). A 
cybercrime is defined as a criminal activity in which computers or computer networks are the 
principal means of committing an offence or violating laws, rules or regulations (Kshetri 2009). 
The International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU’s) definition of cybersecurity is followed: 
“Cybersecurity is the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, 
guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and 
technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s 
assets. Organization and user’s assets include connected computing devices, personnel, 
infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted 
and/or stored information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the 
attainment and maintenance of the security properties of the organization and user’s assets 
against relevant security risks in the cyber environment” (ITU, U.D.) 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The article proceeds by first examining the hollowness in the 
Global South’s digitization initiatives. Next, institutions related to cybersecurity in the Global 
South are analyzed. Then, institutional bottlenecks that affect cybersecurity in the Global South 
are examined. It is followed by a section on discussion and implications. The final section 
provides concluding comments. 
 
Hollowness in the Global South’s digitization initiatives 
 
The concept of “hollow diffusion” of Internet and e-commerce technologies among firms in GS 
economies may help understand weak defense mechanisms (Otis and Evans 2003, p. 49). The 
basic idea behind “hollow diffusion” is simple: Many organizations digitizing their activities lack 
organizational, technological and human resources, and other fundamental ingredients needed to 
secure their system, which is the key for the long-term success of online businesses. To take an 
example is the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) cashless policy planned in January 2012. 
Stakeholders expressed concerns related to broadband infrastructure, tested and accredited 
application software, trust economy, legislation, human skill capacities, call centre backbone, 
consumers’ profile data, data protection as well as credible regulations security (allafrica.com 
2011). In short, the failure on the cybersecurity front hinders their ability to utilize the Internet 
productively. According to the online review site, Ecommerce Platforms, showing that the 
website is “secure and trustworthy” is the key to creating a successful online business (Zorzini 
2016). 
 
“Hollow diffusion” can take place in human (lack of skill and experience) and technological 
terms (failure to use security products). It is argued that organizations that adopt Internet 
technologies without considering the costs and efforts needed to maintain those systems generate 
a negative externality (Kshetri 2010b, d, 2013). Note that the presence of negative externalities 
means that the failure of firms to secure their systems have high social costs. In order to illustrate 
this point one can take an example of Overture South Korea’s “continental cut-off” services, 
which according to a chosun.com article, disregard clicks originated from Africa (Kshetri 
2010a). In general, some ISPs in the industrialized world block contents originated from 
problematic networks based in Africa (Garfinkel 2002). In an attempt to fight click frauds, 
advertisers and pay per click (PPC) search engines activate geo-targeting and monitor traffic 
originated from unusual geographical locations that associated with cybercrime activities. Note 
that many clicks are generated by robots which use infected computers in Africa and other parts 
of the world. To take another example, annual surveys by CyberSource conducted among North 
American merchants and released in 2006 and 2008 indicated that Nigeria and Ghana were 
perceived as the world’s riskiest countries for online transactions. A high proportion of online 
orders originated from these countries were rejected by North American merchants (Dogbevi 
2009). 
 
While the hollowness can involve many dimensions, and has different implications for different 
entities, it can be understood, from our perspective, in terms of the lack of defense mechanisms 
at various levels. That is, hollowness is related to the lack of capacity to manage risks and 
vulnerabilities. Three dimensional of hollowness can be identified that lead to a low degree of 
cybersecurity orientation: technological, human and organizational structure. 
 
Technological dimension of hollowness 
 
In most GS economies there has been a lack of indigenous technology and patents related to 
cybersecurity (Kshetri 2016a). A related point is that while GS economies have generated some 
innovations, they have failed to give sufficient attention to security problems. At the same time 
while there has been a steep decline in the prices of most information and communication 
technology (ICT) products, anti-virus products are unaffordable for most consumers. For 
instance, 60% of Kenyan banks were reported to have insecure systems in 2009 (Kinyanjui 
2009). Cybercriminals are taking advantage of the hollowness by targeting unprotected devices 
and luring unsuspecting customers to fake sites. 
 
Human dimension of hollowness 
 
GS economies are facing a shortage of CS professionals. For instance, consider the government 
of India (GoI). A large number of IT security auditors are needed to evaluate the adequacy of 
controls in the management of project and business processes and validate whether the controls 
are effective (Hettigei 2005). An estimate suggested that in 2013, India had only 60 auditors 
(Doval 2013). Regarding the requirement of government agencies to conduct security auditing of 
IT infrastructures, websites and applications, it is important to note that most Indian government 
agencies’ websites are hosted by the National Informatics Centre (NIC), which was established 
by the GoI to promote IT culture among government organizations. It is argued that NIC-hosted 
websites are vulnerable to cyberattacks due to a shortage of manpower, especially IT security 
auditors. NIC outsources security audit works due to the lack of manpower. Likewise, in 2011, 
India’s central bank, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced a set of recommendations, which 
include the formation of separate information security groups within banks and maintenance of 
adequate cybersecurity resources based on their size and scope of operation. The country is 
finding it difficult to enforce the RBI guidelines due to the lack of IT security auditors to validate 
banks’ cybersecurity practices (Bradbury 2013). 
 
Organizational structure-related dimension of hollowness 
 
Organizational structure involves formally allocating various work roles into distinct tasks as 
well as associated administrative mechanisms in order to control, govern coordinate and 
integrate work activities (Child 1972; Mintzberg 1993). Such activities may also cross formal 
organizational boundaries. On the cybersecurity, one key global trend in organizational structure 
involves the tendency to create the position of Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). For 
instance, a 2014 PwC survey found that only 28% of over 500 companies surveyed had a CISO 
or Chief Security Officer (Damouni 2014). CEOs and board often consult CISOs to understand 
cyber risk, implement appropriate security controls and promote a culture of defense. One study 
suggested that 90% of CISOs are connected directly to their organizations’ top leadership team, 
and half of them were on the leadership team (Sweeney 2016). Most GS-based organizations 
have not yet adopted such a structure. For instance, in India, except for few firms in banking, 
financial services and insurance, telecom, and business process outsourcing (BPO) it is rare to 
have a CISO in organizations (Pandya 2009). 
 
Institutions affecting cybersecurity in the Global South 
 
It can be argued that like any other economic phenomenon (Parto 2005), cybersecurity has 
institutional components and implications. Building on the work of Roland (2004), de Laiglesia 
(2006) classifies all institutions according to the rate of change: “Slow-moving” institutions 
include legal infrastructure, culture and social norms, while laws, rules and regulations, contract 
enforcement, political process and governance are examples of “fast moving” institutions. Such 
an understanding is important because some of the institutional factors can be more easily 
changed than others. For instance, laws and rules related to cybersecurity can be easily written 
on the books in a short period of time. Nonetheless, the development of legal infrastructures such 
as building a well-functioning cybersecurity-related court system and employing judges and law 
enforcement professionals well versed in cybersecurity takes a relatively longer time (Kshetri 
2016a). Mohammad Khairuddin Abdullah, Malaysia’s HeiTech Padu Berhad’s director noted: 
“As long as they [cyber-criminals] are within the country, the criminals can be brought to court, 
but you’ll be lucky if you can find the judge, who can write the warrant and understands the 
issue. Even though cyberlaws are in place, you need to have people who are able to apply the 
laws, as most cybercrime cases will get cold in just 24 hours” (Ismail 2008). Likewise, eBay’s 
Albena Spasova, who worked in promoting law reform in Moldova and Bulgaria noted: “Even in 
2001, I was meeting judges who thought cybercrime was someone stealing a computer” (Wylie 
2007). There has also been the lack of sufficient law enforcement personnel to fight cybercrimes. 
For instance, following raids on cyber cafés in major cities in Nigeria, cybercriminals were 
reported to move to remote areas to carry out their operations (Daily Trust 2010). The porous 
national borders and a lack of states’ controls on their territories allow cybercriminals to migrate 
to jurisdictions with a weaker rule of law (Mazzitelli 2007). There are some statistics to show 
porous national borders’ contribution to inter-jurisdictional arbitrage in West Africa. In 2008, 
40% of arrested cybercrime suspects in Ghana were Nigerians, 38% were Ghanaians and the rest 
were from Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo (Boateng et al. 2010). A Barrister of Nigeria’s EFCC 
noted that anticybercrime measures in the country forced cybercriminals to other countries 
(tmcnet.com 2010). 
 
Culture and social norms 
 
It may be even more challenging to change culture and social norms that may affect 
cybersecurity. For instance, most GS economies lack domestic anti-virus companies. While top 
security software firms are based in industrialized economies, businesses and consumers in GS 
economies, mainly because of nationalism, prefer to buy domestically manufactured software 
(Kshetri 2010c). 
 
In order to further illustrate this point, consider firms in the Indian offshoring industry. In an 
attempt to address their clients’ fear that customer data will be stolen and even sold to criminals, 
Indian firms engaged in outsourcing have taken measures to prevent attacks on computers by 
current and former employees. For instance, call center employees have to undergo security 
checks, which are considered to be “undignified”. Firms have established biometric 
authentication controls for workers and banned cell phones, pens, paper, and Internet/e-mail 
access for employees. Computer terminals at Mphasis, an Indian outsourcing firm, lack hard 
drives, e-mail, CD-ROM drives, or other ways to store, copy, or forward data. The idea here is 
that while employees may be willing to accept security checks that are considered to be 
undignified to get high-paying jobs in the offshoring sector, average Indian organizations may 
not consider implementing such checks that go against the established societal norms. 
 
Conflicting sets of rules of behavior 
 
In some cases, institutional changes are characterized by conflicting sets of rules of behavior, 
which may lead to the collapse of some of the institutional arrangements (de Laiglesia 2006). For 
instance, in some authoritarian regimes, cybersecurity measures mainly focus on cybercontrol 
activities. For instance, it was reported that the governments of Mauritania hired botnet operators 
to attack their critics’ websites with denial-of-service attacks (Cetron and Davies 2009). 
Likewise, Chinese government agencies allegedly sent viruses to attack websites that were 
banned (Guillén and Suárez 2005). Thus for authoritarian governments such as those of China, 
the goals of strengthening national cybersecurity and maintain control over the society with 
cyber-control measures are in conflict, and approaching one means to move away from the 
others.  The above point can be further illustrated by focusing on China’s state strategies with 
regard to ICTs, which seek to balance economic modernization and political control. Stated 
simply, this strategy broadly corresponds to China’s unique approach and perspective to 
cybersecurity, and is reflected in the various cyber-control measures. 
 
It is fair to say that China’s extensive cyber-control measures are supported by institutional 
arrangements in the country, which weaken organizations’ and citizens’ cybersecurity initiatives. 
For instance, one result of China’s weak civil society and strong state is that trade and 
professional associations are likely to engage in activities that are likely to promote the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) authoritarian agenda, despite the conflict of such actions with the 
productive utilization of the Internet. For instance, the Internet Society of China (ISC) 
announced that it would help strengthen cyber-security orientation of users and Internet 
companies. If the past actions of the ISC are any indicator, however, its activities are more likely 
to be prompted by the CCP’s need to maintain the dominance. For instance, in 2001, the ISC 
asked Internet companies to sign a voluntary pledge, which required the signatories not to 
disseminate information “that might threaten state security or social stability” (Kshetri 2007). In 
2009, China’s dominant search engine, Baidu, and 19 other Internet companies received the 
“China Internet Self-Discipline Award”. ISC Officials praised them for their roles in fostering, 
and supporting “harmonious and healthy Internet development” (Kshetri 2013d). 
 
While the Chinese government’s cyber-control measures have been relatively successful, it has 
encountered a host of problems and difficulties to achieve its goals. Unsurprisingly these 
measures have also faced opposition and suffered setbacks as illustrated in the examples below 
(Kshetri 2013b). 
 
Consider the Green Dam Youth Escort firewall software program launched in 2008. The Chinese 
government had announced a plan to make it mandatory to have the Green Dam installed on all 
new PCs in the country. The stated goal of the mandate was to protect children from violent and 
pornographic contents. The first problem the Green Dam faced was that while addressing one 
cybersecurity issue, it created side effects that raised another. For instance, while it successfully 
blocked politically sensitive contents, many viewed that the software would represent significant 
risks to users as a single flaw in the Green Dam system would expose the entire Chinese 
population to cybercriminals. For instance, a hacker able to attack the Green Dam system could 
have access to the information of all users who had installed the system. 
 
A second problem stemmed from the fact that it increased PC manufacturers' costs, which led to 
an additional financial burden on consumers. While the Green Dam would be free to users, 
manufacturers needed to pay license fees to the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) to install the software (Kshetri 2013b). 
 
A third related problem had to do with strong opposition from computer manufacturers and the 
public. They opposed because the proposed measures lead to increased costs of PC. For example, 
Lenovo, which is 57% government-owned, and Internet users, who are increasingly acting on a 
bottom-up approach, participated in collective resistance efforts to abort the Green Dam. Given 
the national security and economic risks and a strong resistance, the Green Dam program was 
indefinitely delayed after being installed in 20 million PCs. The unsustainable business model 
led to the closure of BDLKPRC in the 2010 and the company was near bankruptcy (Kshetri 
2013b). 
 
Another example is a 2011 regulation, which required microbloggers to register using their real 
name. The regulation was introduced so that law enforcement agencies would know the real 
user's identity in anything objectionable to the Chinese Communist Party was posted. The 
Nasdaq-listed Chinese online media company, Sina, warned that such a requirement would 
negatively influence user activity and threaten its popular microblogging service, Sina Weibo. 
Even after the March 16, 2012 deadline, Sina Weibo continued to allow users, who had not 
registered their real names to post and use its services (Kshetri 2013b). 
 
Lessons from the above example 
 
What lesson can be learned from the above examples? First, the regulatory infrastructures have 
not kept pace with the rapid rise in cybercrimes in the GS economies. Second, some of the social 
and cultural norms are not conducive to cybersecurity. Third, in the case of some GS economies 
(e.g., China), the diversion of resources to cyber-control has led to only limited progress on the 
cybersecurity front. There are, however, clear pressures that are likely to promote changes in 
cybersecurity-friendly institutions. Prior research has suggested that institutional changes can be 
seen as an outcome of the dynamic interactions of contradictions. Seo and Creed (2002) have 
proposed four sources of contradictions and “praxis”: “(1) legitimacy that undermines functional 
inefficiency, (2) adaptation that undermines adaptability, (3) intra-institutional conformity that 
creates inter-institutional incompatibilities, and (4) isomorphism that conflict with divergent 
interests”. Regarding (1), if policy makers see clear economic benefits of cybersecurity 
(functional/economic efficiency of cybersecurity), they are likely to lead efforts to change 
relevant regulations. For instance, the Chinese government gave up the requirement to install 
Green Dam due to economic reasons. Note that China’s state strategies toward ICTs have been to 
balance economic modernization and political control (Kalathil 2003). Likewise, in order to 
secure high‐paying jobs that the Indian outsourcing sector offers (functional/economic 
efficiency of cybersecurity), workers in the industry are willing to act against their social norms 
and undergo security checks, which are perceived as undignified. 
 
Institutional bottlenecks and cybersecurity in the Global South 
 
The impacts of “slow-moving” and “fast moving” institutions on cybersecurity can be better 
explained with the concept of institutional bottlenecks. The idea here is that various institutional 
factors in the GS are likely to result in bottlenecks and congestions that impede the efforts to 
fight cybercrimes. 
 
Some elements of “fast-moving” institutions, such as corruption, lack of accountability and weak 
law enforcement may create bottlenecks for development. In this regard, Indian firms have 
generally expressed dissatisfaction and frustration with irresponsible and unaccountable law 
enforcement agencies. For instance, while most BPOs in Gurgaon had been cybercrime victims 
about 70% of the respondents did not report to the police (indiatimes.com 2011). Most 
organizations reported doubt about competence, professionalism and integrity of the police in 
handling cybercrime cases. About 50% of the respondents not reporting thought that the cases 
were not dealt with professionally and 30% noted that they had “no faith” in Gurgaon police 
(indiatimes.com 2011). 
 
Institutional bottlenecks and technology-related issues 
 
In a framework proposed by de Laiglesia (2006) for the analysis of institutional bottlenecks in 
GS, technology-related issues and factors are present at three levels of the framework: 
technological progress and dissemination (institutional outcomes), technology opportunity set 
(interaction and decision area), technology use, adoption and development (intermediate 
outcomes). This section analyzes how these elements may affect cybersecurity. 
 
Concerning the technological progress and dissemination, some GS economies’ wrong-headed 
focus on cyber-control as a component of cybersecurity has affected economic development 
negatively. For instance, China's administrative monopoly, which has excessively focused on 
serving narrow constituencies and has been largely unresponsive to the needs of the majority of 
the population, has become one of the largest institutional bottlenecks that has limited the 
country's capacity to utilize ICTs for economic growth and development. In this way, China’s 
political framing of cybersecurity issues has done a great disservice to organizations in their 
pursuit of economic activities. 
 
As noted earlier most GS economies lack domestic anti-virus companies. One way to understand 
the low level of technological progress is the lack of absorptive capacity, which means that many 
GS economies exhibit a low level of national capabilities in the assimilation of technologies and 
associated organizational practices (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Dahlmann and Nelson 1995). 
This can be attributed to their institutional and social arrangements (Niosi 2008). To put things in 
context, institutional, social and organizational arrangements in the GS are not capable of coping 
with the rapid rise in cybercrimes. For instance, in 2004, of the 4,400 police officers in India’s 
Mumbai city, only five worked in the cybercrime division (Duggal 2004). As of 2011, the Delhi 
police cybercrime cell had only two inspectors (Anand 2011). In 2012, the Delhi High Court 
criticized the lack of functionality of the Delhi Police website, which according to the court was 
"completely useless ... obsolete and does not serve any purpose" (Nolen 2012, p. A1). Likewise, 
Malaysia’s HeiTech Padu Berhad’s director noted that out of the country’s 40,000 lawyers, only 
four were able to handle cybercrimes (Ismail 2008). In the same vein, in the ITU Regional 
Cyber-security Forum for Eastern and Southern Africa held in Zambia in 2008, an expert from 
the Democratic Republic of Congo stated that factors such as the lack of legal experts in ICT and 
poor understanding of ICTs and its added value in the national economy was hindering the 
adoption of CS-related legislation in the country (ITU 2008; Kshetri 2010b). Without sufficient 
measures to secure their computers, GS-based organizations will not be in a position to realize 
the full benefits of the ICTs. 
 
Concerning the technology opportunity set, GS economies have a tendency to use low cost, yet 
insecure technologies. While some argue that networks in economies such as China have built-in 
security mechanisms, as they have “wired security into their IT network infrastructure” 
compared to the Western approach of “bolting it on afterward to legacy systems” (Hawser 2011). 
Note that many systems in the industrialized world were developed before cybersecurity was a 
concern. However, contrary observations have been reported. For instance, China’s cyber-
victimization can be partly attributed to the country’s crime-prone technologies. According to 
Microsoft’s IE6Countdown website (http://www.ie6countdown.com/), as of January 2012, 6th 
version of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer (IE6) accounted for 27.9% of browsers in China. This 
compares with IE6’s shares 1% in the U.S., and below 0.5% in Scandinavian countries. IE6 is 
reported to be an inherently insecure and hacker-friendly browser. In 2006, for instance, Internet 
Explorer was reported to be unsafe for 284 days. 
 
GS economies also tend to use low cost and insecure technologies. Some GS-based 
manufacturers also reportedly use cybercrime-prone products in order to reduce the cost of PCs 
and other devices. The documents of a cyber-fraud lawsuit filed by Microsoft against a Chinese-
owned domain provide a glimpse into this phenomenon. Microsoft's digital crimes unit 
investigating counterfeit software and malware in China had bought 20 new computers from 
Chinese retailers. The unit found counterfeit versions of Windows installed on all the machines 
and malware pre-installed on four of them (Kirk 2012). It was reported that when a brand new 
and direct from the factory condition laptops bought in Shenzhen was booted up for the first 
time, the Nitol virus was hidden in the laptop’s hard drive. The virus started searching for 
another computer on the Internet. The laptop was made by a Guangzhou, China-based computer 
manufacturer, Hedy (Kirk 2012). 
 
Finally, concerning the technology use, adoption and development, many Internet users in the 
GS are inexperienced and not technically savvy. A high proportion of them are getting 
computers and connecting to the Internet for the first time. A majority of them also lack English 
language. This later point is crucial due to the fact that most of the information, instructions, and 
other contents for security products are available in English language only. Many Internet users 
in the GS are thus unable to use IT security products developed in English language. 
 
Discussion and implications 
 
While adoption of technologies and organizational forms developed elsewhere allows poor 
countries to catch up with opportunities in rich countries, the majority of GS economies have 
failed to seize these opportunities (Wade 2008, quoting The Economist). This observation is 
equally evident in the case of cybersecurity. Cybersecurity issues have also brought about a 
radical challenge to the traditional way of measuring technology adoption and usage by using 
indicators such as the penetration levels or utilization levels (Easterly and Levine 1997; Veiseh 
2010). 
 
The above discussion suggests that technological, human, behavioral and policy-related factors 
have contributed to the hollowness of the GS economies on the ICT front. Organizations’ and 
consumers’ low levels of spending on IT security, in combination with low degree of 
cybersecurity consciousness, suggest some of the sources of the hollowness of the GS 
cyberspace (Kshetri 2010b, d, 2013). Cybersecurity orientations of businesses, consumers and 
the government agencies are determined by a set of factors different from those that are 
important for the digitalization of economic activities. While the GS is closing its economic gap 
in relation to the factors contributing to digitization, notable lags are inherent in factors related to 
cybersecurity. 
 
The above discussion also indicates that cybercrimes originated in the GS have interesting 
international dimensions. Overture South Korea’s “continental cut-off” service and similar other 
examples indicate that there are already some signs that online transactions and activities 
originated in Africa and other GS economies are disregarded or dismissed by economic actors 
located in industrialized world. To take another example, Bordelinx, a U.S. based international 
electronic facilitator, stopped its services to clients from Kenya due to cybercrime concerns. 
 
Cybercrime growth in Africa and other GS economies may increase the risk of exclusion of the 
continent’s businesses and consumers from the cyberspace. A Telegraph article has summarized 
best as to how 419 scams have harbored distrust of Nigerians: “Trust in Nigerian businessmen 
and princes” is among the “50 things that are being killed by the internet”. 
 
An assertion of the dual economy approach is that GS economies are characterized by an uneven 
development within a sector as well as between various sectors of an economy (Chenery 1975). 
This uneven and unequal development translates into differential cybersecurity performance and 
capability. This can be illustrated best by comparing India’s outsourcing sector with other 
economic sectors. Studies conducted by Forrester Research and by the U.K.’s Banking Code 
Standards Board indicated that cybersecurity standards in Indian call centers were among the 
best in the world. As noted above, some firms in India’s banking, financial services and 
insurance, telecom, BPO sectors already have CISO in organizations (Pandya 2009). This means 
that new roles of CISO in organization are defined and rationalized by corporate boards of 
directors, CS professionals, legislatures, and regulatory agencies. Rowan (1982) refers to this 
stage as institution building. This stage is often followed by a period of diffusion, in which a 
large number of organizations may adopt the newly institutionalized organizational roles (Rowan 
1982). This is likely to happen if the new roles gain legitimacy and are perceived as useful 
additions to the existing organizational structure. 
 
Most economic sectors in India and other GS economies, however, have suffered from a poor 
level of cybersecurity. In this regard, prior research suggests that political, moral or technical 
crises and competition from alternative structures in other institutional sectors can destabilize the 
institutional and economic foundation of an existing organizational structure (Rowan 1982). This 
means that pressure for change in the existing cybersecurity practices is likely to build in the 
broader economy of the GS. At the same time regulators and policymakers need to be aware of 
the increasing importance of cybersecurity with increasing digitization and focus on regulation, 
education and other measures to strengthen cybersecurity and stimulate the institutional change 
process. 
 
Concluding comments 
 
The above examples are illustrative of how even genuine transactions originated from the GS are 
rejected by businesses in the industrialized world. This is a result of a hollow digitization of the 
GS. In this regard, the discussion in this paper suggests that appropriate public policy in the 
development of the digital society and economy must include steps to strengthen individuals’ 
and organizations’ attention and orientation to cybersecurity and enhance absorptive capacity in 
cybersecurity. A multifaceted and multi-pronged approach to address the dark side of GS 
economies’ digitization is needed. For instance, governments and regulators can increase social 
trust by punishing people who are engaged in scams. Technological measures include 
elimination of insecure technologies such as counterfeit software and increasing the use of 
cybersecurity applications such as antivirus software. It is also important to promote 
cybersecurity within organizations with better education and training. GS-based organizations 
need to embed cybersecurity-oriented culture throughout the workforce. 
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